When Congolese officials blocked a $1.4 billion sale of Chemaf Resources to China’s Norinco this spring, the trading desks in Geneva chalked it up to another skirmish in the cobalt wars.
What followed was less expected: a consortium led by New York fund-manager Orion Resource Partners and Virtus Minerals, a Washington-area company staffed by former U.S. special-forces and intelligence officers, stepped in with a rival bid for the struggling producer. Negotiations are advanced but not yet exclusive, according to people familiar with the talks.
Why Chemaf matters
Chemaf controls Mutoshi, a stalled open-pit in Katanga designed to yield 16,000 tonnes of cobalt and 50,000 tonnes of copper a year—enough cobalt for roughly 2.5 million electric-vehicle battery packs. It also holds dozens of exploration titles in a province that already supplies about 70 % of global cobalt output. Trafigura Group, which arranged a $600 million loan for Chemaf in 2022, remains the largest secured creditor. 
When cobalt prices slumped last year, construction halted and Chemaf began shopping itself. Norinco, a state-owned Chinese arms maker with two other mines in Congo, agreed to a takeover that would have paid out Trafigura and the banks. But the Congolese state miner Gécamines, whose permit underpins Mutoshi, refused to sign off. U.S. diplomats also lobbied President Félix Tshisekedi to stop the transfer, arguing that another Chinese deal would tighten Beijing’s grip on a mineral Washington deems critical.
The U.S. angle
Virtus Minerals positions itself as a “mission-focused” operator with expertise in sensitive supply chains. Its president, Gregory Roberts, served in the CIA and on the House Intelligence Committee; managing director Phil Braun is an active-duty Green Beret. Should the offer succeed, Orion would fund the acquisition while Virtus assumes day-to-day control of Mutoshi and Chemaf’s smaller Étoile mine.
The bid dovetails with a draft U.S.–DRC critical-minerals framework that links American investment to security assistance in eastern Congo. The White House wants alternative sources of cobalt for North American battery plants, and Kinshasa wants leverage against both Chinese miners and Rwanda-backed rebels destabilising the copper belt.
Obstacles on the ground
Gécamines has its own designs: the state company tabled a competing offer last October and has publicly asserted it must “monitor any acquisition” of Chemaf before re-licensing Mutoshi. Its chairman, Guy-Robert Lukama, argues that prior foreign deals left too little value in country. Unless Gécamines receives equity or a larger royalty slice, it can simply withhold the permit renewal.
Meanwhile, Chemaf’s debt still hovers near $900 million. Sources close to Trafigura say any restructuring must leave the trading house whole or confer offtake rights comparable to the 2022 loan package. How much Orion is prepared to pay— and whether unsecured lenders take a haircut—remains opaque.
Timing and geopolitics
Talks are time-sensitive. Norinco retains an informal right to come back with an improved proposal until Congo’s mines ministry formally rejects its June 2024 filing. Market participants expect a decision before the annual African Mining Indaba in early February, where Kinshasa hopes to present itself as an open yet nationally assertive investment destination.
For the U.S. consortium, success hinges on convincing Tshisekedi that veteran-run Virtus can stabilise operations, satisfy local employment quotas and accelerate development faster than a Chinese state giant. For Kinshasa, the prize is two-fold: diversification of partners and a fresh injection of capital into an asset critical for the battery economy.
Battery makers are already recalibrating supply maps. Benchmark Mineral Intelligence projects a 35 % surge in cobalt demand by 2030, even as some chemistries reduce cobalt intensity. If Mutoshi comes on line at nameplate capacity, it would rank among the three largest single-site sources globally—second only to CMOC’s Tenke Fungurume and comparable to Glencore’s Mutanda. Matching that potential to secure logistics—rail to Dar es Salaam and a power agreement with state utility SNEL—remains the bigger test.
